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Michel Foucault recounted in 1966 his laughter while reading a passage by Jorge 
Luis Borges that revealed to him “the exotic charm of another system of 
thought.” Borges quoted from “a certain Chinese encyclopedia” entitled Celestial 
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge in which the Chinese had classified animals 
into a series of bizarre divisions whose order was impossible to fathom, such as 
“those that have broken a flower vase,” or “those that resemble flies from a dis-
tance.” Borges attributed the title and content of the encyclopedia to Dr. Franz 
Kuhn (1889-1961), a prolific German translator of Chinese novels. Foucault 
drew the lesson that Chinese exoticisms revealed the limitations in our system of 
thought. He noted, for instance, that Western use of an alphabetical series sepa-
rated all entries from their natural affinities, linking them instead arbitrarily.  
Borges’s fable about enumerations from China challenges our efforts to estab-
lish an unproblematic lexical order among things. Borges’s caricature enabled 
Foucault to reframe fruitfully the early modern European act of classifying new 
curiosities in the eighteenth century, which, arguably, gave the sciences of life a 
new precision and scope. By comparison, pre-modern Chinese versions of natural 
history, more accurately, “an historical array of entries about things” (bowu 博 
物), still resembled natural history in the classical period in the West, when a 
dividing line between living and non-living things was not decisive.  
Like their classicist counterparts in sixteenth century Europe, the Chinese au-
thors of naturalist compendia sought to identify and classify natural phenomena 
through a correct language of words (zhengming 正 名). For them, all phenome-
na originated from the stuff of the world (qi 氣) formed through the spontaneous 
shaping of all things (zaohua 造 化) by some sort of ultimate shaping force (zao-
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hua zhu 造 化 主) or internal power (zaowu zhu 造 物 主). They mediated efforts 
to make sense of the world of things through their prevailing social, political, and 
cultural hierarchies. Before the arrival of the Jesuits, the classical method of 
investigating things (gewu 格 物) and extending knowledge (zhizhi 致 知) was a 
key feature of Chinese literati efforts to set the limits of the natural and establish 
the boundaries for the known and unknown. Finding the “correct conceptional 
grid” (following Andrew Plaks) had also required “investigating meanings, con-
ceptions, and ideas” (geyi 格 義) when foreigners introduced new religions such 
as Buddhism to China after A.D. 200. To this end, Chinese scholars compared 
foreign terms in light of native doctrines to determine any systematic correspond-
ences between them. 
After 1600 the Jesuits linked the Chinese “investigation of things” to Europe-
an higher learning (scientia, i.e., philosophical, theological, and natural studies). 
Natural studies in premodern China had long implied that things (wu 物) includ-
ed visible objects, physical or mental phenomena, and historical events. Since the 
Song dynasty (960-1280), literati contended that things and affairs were synony-
mous. Each revealed universal principles (wanwu zhi li 萬 物 之 理). Chinese 
classifications thereafter reflected the cultural priorities of literati elites who saw 
principles in all things. 
Unlike early modern European scientific culture, where natural history was 
increasingly encompassed in a museum, the historical array of entries about 
things, phenomena, events, and affairs (bowu, i.e., “broad learning of things”) 
represented a nuanced account of natural phenomena as words in a text that 
needed to be decoded primarily through the analysis of language by connois-
seurs. Each historical or natural event, natural object or man-made implement, 
and mental or physical phenomena could be described chronologically in terms 
of a teleology of its usefulness or value to humans.  
The very valuable volume under review here represents an effort to describe 
how traditional Chinese terminology for natural studies, government, logic, lin-
guistics, materia medica, chemistry, and mathematics changed during the nine-
teenth century under the impact of “new terms for new ideas” coined in the West 
and Japan during the late Qing period, 1860 to 1900. An old system of Chinese 
classification was slowly but irrevocably superseded, and a new set of terms 
prepared the linguistic ground for the emergence of the social, political, and 
natural sciences in modern China. Crossing the boundaries between linguistic and 
historical studies, the authors in this volume delineate this linguistic transition in 
China by addressing how the Chinese language adapted to and changed under the 
influence of Western knowledge. Such lexical change via translation began in 
earnest, the editors contend, after 1860 under the influence of Protestant mission-
aries. 
The first set of articles in the volume focus on language as a “clumsy medi-
um” for cultural interaction. Viviane Alleton, for example, rightly takes issue 
with contemporary claims that the Chinese language was inadequate for foreign 
terms and modern ideas. Comparing China and Japan, Alleton contends that the 
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historical and social contexts trumped the civilizational constructs that scholars 
have adumbrated to explain the divergent responses of Qing China and Meiji 
Japan to the new Western learning. I have found that the stated ambivalences of 
late-nineteenth-century Euro-American translators confirm Alleton’s point. In 
1880, for instance, John Fryer rejected the popular view that Chinese was inade-
quate for scientific discourse. Moreover, Fryer discarded the notion that English 
would become a universal language or that China would ever be ruled by foreign 
powers. Much later in a May 22, 1895, letter seeking the chair of Oriental Lan-
guages at Berkeley University, which he would be offered in July, Fryer ex-
plained: “However necessary it may be for China to have the arts and sciences of 
the West translated into the native language and disseminated throughout the 
country in the first instance, it stands to reason that this will only succeed up to a 
point. Beyond that point no amount of translation can keep pace with the re-
quirements of this age of progress.” Reacting to China’s unexpected defeat in the 
Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895, Fryer predicted “the gradual decay of the Chi-
nese language and literature,” and concluded that “sooner or later the end must 
come, and English be the learned language of the Empire.” John Fryer’s percep-
tion of the missionary failure to change China mirrored the missionaries’ predis-
position after 1895 to place the blame for such an imagined failure when com-
pared to Meiji Japan on Chinese civilization and its benighted language, an over-
determination that with hindsight was false. 
Benjamin T’sou extends Alleton’s views by advocating a broad approach to 
cultural diffusion. Placing the Chinese language within the historical context of 
the global circulation of cultural items, T’sou shows how China’s lexical borrow-
ings were mediated by language, culture, and social structure. A narrow, linguis-
tic approach to such borrowings would simply follow the flow of the loan words 
themselves, but such an account would miss how often cultural compatibility was 
the key issue that determined whether phonetic or semantic adaptation was cho-
sen for a lexical import. Because the Chinese written language placed no limits 
on phonetic adaptation, the success of the adoptions that were made depended on 
the agreeability, familiarity, accessibility of the specific changes and not on glob-
al civilizational factors. 
Wolfgang Lippert’s article in this section looks at the role of language in the 
modernization process, and he explains how Western concepts and terms were 
integrated by Chinese and Japanese translators in stages during the nineteenth 
century. Lippert shows how the modernization of the Chinese and Japanese lan-
guages was not a simple process where Meiji Japan took the lead. Initially in the 
1860s many lexical borrowings from Western languages first took place in Qing 
China and then were transmitted to Japan. In addition, new Western terms creat-
ed from the 1870s in Japan often depended on older classical terms from the 
Chinese lexicon, which were sources of inspiration for Meiji savants such as 
Nishi Amane and others. Terms in Japanese such as kaguku 科 學 for “science,” 
derived from a Song dynasty term for civil examination studies (keju zhi xue 科 
舉 之 學 = kexue/kagaku), which then returned to China as a new translation for 
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“science” from Meiji Japan as a “round-trip” concept (following Lydia Liu and 
Victor Mair). 
The second set of articles in this volume address the “politics of names.” 
Xiong Yuezhi looks at the translation and usage of the political terms in classical 
Chinese for liberty (ziyou 自 由), democracy (minzhu 民 主), and president 
(zongtong 總 統) in late Qing China. He concludes that the production of neolo-
gisms such as these represented a complex process that took time to become 
properly understood as new ideas in a period of intellectual ferment. Xiong de-
scribes how the old, negative connotations of these “new terms” in classical Chi-
nese took time to be left behind as Chinese literates internalized the new content 
of the political terms. Initially, the term for liberty implied lawlessness in Chi-
nese, democracy suggested a lord of the people or a government of the rabble, 
while a president seemed to represent a gang leader, chieftain, or monarch. These 
idiosyncratic terms were more a product of the choices Protestants made to trans-
late such political concepts rather than the simple persistence of Chinese tradi-
tion. 
Similarly, Fang Weigui describes how nineteenth century Chinese used the 
terms yi 夷, yang 洋, xi 西, and wai 外 to describe peoples, things, and events 
from outside Qing China. By tracing the history of these terms as markers for 
Westerners and European civilization, Fang sees a remarkable transition in late 
imperial China from using a pejorative notion of “barbarian” to describe the 
“other” to a more cosmopolitan concept of “foreigner.” Fang reads such changing 
attitudes towards foreigners in late imperial China out of the linguistic turn from 
yi and fan 番 to refer to the “other” and towards yang, xi, and wai in Chinese 
documents and writings to describe foreigners less as barbarians or savages. To 
properly weigh the scope and limits of Fang’s internalist account of such linguis-
tic changes, readers should also refer to the work of Lydia Liu who has argued, 
perhaps too one-sidedly, that imperialism was more responsible than Chinese 
xenophobia for the translation into English of yi as “barbarian” during British 
parliamentary debates preceding the Opium War. Liu contends that such Chinese 
terms were inherently less vituperative particularly because the Qing rulers as 
non-Chinese were themselves always on the lookout for anti-barbarian attacks by 
Han Chinese on Mongols and Manchus. 
Rune Svarverud concludes this second set of articles by presenting an ety-
mology for the notions of power and rights (quanli 權 力) in Chinese political 
discourse in the late nineteenth century. Like Xiong Yuezhi, Svarverud traces 
how divergent notions of political rights were read into the terms chosen to trans-
late such rights into classical Chinese. The lexical choices that William Martin 
chose for his translation of Wheaton’s International Law, for example, blurred 
the distinction between rights and power in China. Meiji Japanese also chose 
Martin’s translations to express rights in Japanese legal terms, and their success 
there explains why the complex etymological lineage for quanli in China must 
include its transmission to Japan and back again, another case of a Sino-Japanese 
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round-trip word that depended for its linguistic success in China on its Japanese 
pedigree after the Sino-Japanese War. 
“Negotiating equivalence” is the common theme that runs through the articles 
in the third set of articles. Joachim Kurtz’s thoughtful contribution discusses the 
naturalization of the Western notion of logic in China. His account of the “adven-
tures of logic in China” focuses on the diachronic shifts in its Chinese discursive 
history. Kurtz notes that Jesuit discourses on Aristotelian logic were never very 
influential, despite earlier overstated claims about the impact of Euclid’s geome-
try in late-Ming China. After Aquinas and others had reconciled the Muslim 
harvest of classical learning with Christian theology, the preferred order of Aris-
totelian learning for the Renaissance scholars became: 1) logic; 2) mathematics; 
3) natural science; 4) moral philosophy; and 5) metaphysics. The Jesuits trans-
mitted Aristotelian cosmology, physics, and meteorology through their Scholastic 
theory of knowledge, but they presented deductive logic as a technically forbid-
ding set of terms opaque for non-Christian Chinese. 
Later, Protestants in the nineteenth century presented inductive logic and 
Western reasoning with little added precision or care, and their lexical use of 
many Chinese terms was misleading. Kurtz concludes that logic in China had 
multiple identities, which represented the personal preferences of the Jesuits and 
Protestants rather than the field of logic per se. For the Chinese, logic did not 
matter very much until they associated logic with global civilizational ideals in a 
comparative context. This ironically led Chinese to construct and balance region-
al notions of Chinese, Indian, and Western logic as different forms of reasoning. 
Zhang Baichun’s article looks at the history of the Chinese terms for ma-
chines (jiqi 機 器) and machinery (jixie 機 械). Zhang’s account reveals how 
Jesuits and Protestants successfully incorporated the terms for machines and 
machinery in their translations. Zhang details how Ming literati and artisans had 
applied other terms, such as tool or implement (qi 器), controlling mechanism (ji 
機), and device, contrivance, or weapon (xie 械), to utensils and cannon. Johann 
Schreck’s (Terrenz, 1576-1630) “Diagrams and Explanations of the Marvelous 
Devices of the Far West” (Yuanxi qiqi tushuo luzui 遠 西 奇 器 圖 說 錄 最, 
1627), for instance, presented traditional European craftsmanship in light of 
Chinese artisanship. Later, Qing Chinese and Manchus assimilated these terms to 
industrial machinery in the nineteenth century. 
Iwo Amelung delineates the complicated and paradoxical reception of West-
ern mechanics in late imperial China. In the case of the Chinese term for mechan-
ics, two legitimate translations competed in the 1860s. These terms could be 
traced back to Schreck’s “Diagrams and Explanations of the Marvelous Devices 
of the Far West,” which discussed the principles of weight (qingzhong 輕 重) and 
force (liyi 力 藝). Although Schreck’s account coined the term for the “study of 
weight” (zhongxue 重 學), that is, a pre-Newtonian notion of mechanics, his 
account also stressed the role of force (liyi 力 藝). The former term likely influ-
enced nineteenth century translations of mechanics by Alexander Wylie, John 
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Fryer, Joseph Edkins, and Li Shanlan. William Martin, however, challenged their 
translations in his 1868 textbook on the sciences when he prepared a section on 
mechanics, which he entitled “Introduction to Force” (“Lixue rumen” 力 學 入 
門). A similar confusion of terms for mechanics prevailed in Meiji Japan. Ame-
lung notes that the shift to force as the standard translation for mechanics in Chi-
na occurred circa 1910. As in the case of logic, the failure to establish exact 
equivalences for Western mechanics allowed Chinese to equate the field with 
Chinese traditions drawing from the Mohist Canon, which Chinese invented as a 
native tradition of mechanics. 
The fourth set of papers describes how Chinese translators chose “their own 
terms” to negotiate the adaptation of new terms for new ideas. David Wright’s 
article looks at translators such as Lin Shu, whose translated texts became popu-
lar even though Lin did not know the source languages. Wright also describes 
Yan Fu’s benign attitudes towards lexical ambiguity from the angle of infidelity 
and ingenuity in translations. Yan Fu used neologisms for his scientific transla-
tions, which referred to native traditions that he thought successfully illuminated 
the source-texts. Remarkably, Yan invented ingenious linguistic parallels for his 
“new terms” from the classical storehouse of Chinese thought. 
Ingo Schäfer’s article discusses the physics and metaphysics underlying Tan 
Sitong’s concepts of qi 氣 and yitai 以 太. It should be read in light of David 
Wright’s article enitiled “Tan Sitong and the Ether Reconsidered” (Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 57 [1994]), because Schäfer idiosyncrati-
cally avoids linking Tan’s discourse on yitai with the role of “ether” in contem-
porary Euro-American physics. For Schäfer, Tan’s appropriations of terms and 
ideas from Western natural philosophy were incised subjectively into his philo-
sophical and political outlook. While, this internalist view of Tan’s natural phi-
losophy is useful, it is also a bit solipsistic. Tan’s use of the yitai began in an 
essay published in 1897 in which he unified the materialistic framework for the 
chemical elements by making ether (= yitai) the origin of the all the elements. 
Earlier William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) had theorized that ether might turn out 
to be the universal substratum for all physical phenomena. Drawing on the Chi-
nese notion of qi as an undifferentiated, primal stuff from which all things de-
rived, Tan redefined the yitai (= ether) as an unchanging essence behind all ex-
ternal phenomenal forms, which connected the physical, mental, and spiritual 
realms through the action of benevolence (ren 仁). 
Of course Tan Sitong’s understanding of Western science was uniquely his 
own, but he drew on notions of the ether and electricity held by eminent Western 
scientists at the time, which had been presented first in science translations for 
the Jiangnan Arsenal, which Tan had purchased while in Shanghai. Moreover, 
Tan’s use of the concept of yitai in his “Studies of Benevolence” (Renxue 仁 學) 
maintained the traditional Chinese notion of a continuum between the physical 
and spiritual realms. In the nineteenth century, however, the wave theory of light, 
the discovery of electromagnetic fields, and the propagation of electromagnetic 
waves revived theories of the ether to explain theoretical problems in physics. 
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Since 1854, William Thomson and others in Britain were searching for a con-
sistent physical theory of ether and matter that would explain the continuum of 
matter through space. Earlier the notion that ether was a carrier of waves of light 
and radiant heat had been developed, but its electrical, magnetic, and thermody-
namic characteristics were not understood. 
Accordingly, Tan’s appropriation of the yitai paralleled the attempt by Euro-
pean physicists to affirm “ether” as the fundamental unity of spiritual and materi-
al phenomena. Balfour Stewart, whose English primers on physics had been 
translated by Young J. Allen (1875) and Joseph Edkins (1886) into Chinese, had 
claimed as a coauthor of an 1875 volume entitled The Unseen Universe or 
Speculations on a Future State (New York: Macmillan) that the human person-
ality survived as a spiritual entity after death in a parallel universe. Similarly, 
before 1905 when electromagnetic fields were better understood, James Maxwell 
and his supporters believed that ether was not reducible to any known physical 
substance. Moreover, the attractiveness of idealist thought in nineteenth-century 
Europe among those who sought to redirect the mechanistic physics of atomists 
toward a spiritually informed world, made it possible for the concept of ether to 
appeal to both specialists and non-specialists. In China, publicists such as Tan 
Sitong and Kang Youwei drew on this view of ether (= yitai) as an active medium 
in the universe and molded its content in light of Chinese natural philosophy. 
Reassessing a longstanding inquiry, Wang Yangzong’s article presents a new 
look at the translations of chemical terms by John Fryer and Xu Shou, which 
James Reardon Anderson among others described earlier. Wang explains the 
terminological choices Fryer and Xu made in their translation. For the individual 
chemical elements they successfully integrated both phonetic and graphic as-
pects. But their resourceful efforts to invent terms for chemical compounds by 
combining the Chinese terms used for each of the elements proved unproductive. 
Their felicitous translations for chemical concepts also revealed the limitations in 
their understanding of modern chemistry. Wang’s article shows that for the mis-
sionaries and their collaborators their translation abilities alone were not enough 
to render modern science accurately. 
We should add that chemical terminology in particular became contentious 
among competing translators. Considerable variations in Chinese terms for the 
same chemical elements, for example, occurred in five early and influential 
chemistry translations associated with Benjamin Hobson in 1855, William Martin 
in 1868, John Fryer in 1869, John Kerr in 1870-1871, and Anatole Billequin in 
1873, among others. The German missionary Wilhelm Lobscheid developed an 
earlier nomenclature for chemical elements from 1866 to 1869 for his English 
and Chinese Dictionary (Ying-Hua zidian 英 華 字 典) in Hong Kong, but his 
translations neglected the phonetic element in Chinese characters and were prob-
lematic. Even the Chinese for the notion of a chemical element varied among 
translators. Rival translations created animosities. Fryer and John Kerr, for in-
stance, began corresponding in November 1869 about their different translations 
of the same chemical text, namely David Wells’ Principles and Applications of 
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Chemistry (N.Y. and Chicago, 1858, 1862). In 1895, their enmity over the issue 
still lingered on when Kerr was criticized by Fryer in a missionary journal. 
For the fifth set of articles, the authors continue the theme of “competing no-
menclatures” raised above. Shen Guowei uses three bilingual dictionaries to 
analyze the creation of technical terms in English-Chinese dictionaries from the 
nineteenth century. He shows that the personal views of the missionary transla-
tors influenced their dictionary efforts. Elijah Coleman Bridgman avoided coin-
ing new terms in his dictionary, which led to semantic confusion because “new 
terms” were elided into traditional concepts and thus lost their cutting-edge 
meanings. Despite the initial influence of Bridgman’s Chinese Chrestomathy, 
however, its limited circulation meant that few of Bridgman’s terms became 
normative. Moreover, Bridgman presented English translations for Chinese 
phrases with a Cantonese Romanization of the Chinese characters. Lobscheid was 
bolder for his English and Chinese Dictionary, but his nomenclature for the 
chemical elements also reflected his peculiar understanding of the Chinese lan-
guage. Justus Doolittle successfully synthesized the wide range of lexical terms 
that were available to him for his dictionary in 1872, but the compound words he 
presented never survived the competition with rival terms that inundated China 
from Japan after 1900. 
Andrea Bréard’s valuable account of mathematical terminology shows how 
important numeracy as a complement to literacy is in any account of culture 
crossing in nineteenth century China. In her article, Bréard shows how modern 
mathematical terminology was modified and extended from the traditional Chi-
nese semiotic framework. She demonstrates that the translation of mathematical 
texts required not only a new set of terms but also a new set of operational sym-
bols. These new symbols survived somewhat more successfully after 1900 when 
the translations for new terms were quickly superseded by even newer Japanese 
loan words. Li Shanlan’s and Alexander Wylie’s translation entitled “Step by 
Step in Algebra, the Differential and Integral Calculus” (Dai weiji shiji 代 微 積 
拾 級, 1859) successfully reintroduced the Cartesian algebraic symbols rejected 
in 1712 by the Kangxi emperor. 
Wylie and Li resourcefully translated mathematical notations, concepts, and 
theorems for the calculus. They made the symbols look Chinese, enough to be 
compatible with native “four unknowns’ notation” (siyuan shu 四 元 術). The 
new notional forms had to be convincing if Chinese were to grasp the suitability 
of the calculus. When Alexander Wylie and John Fryer finally introduced the 
differential and integral calculus in the middle of the nineteenth century, Li Shan-
lan and others appreciated its sophistication because they had already mastered 
“single unknown” (tianyuan shu 天 元 術) and “four unknowns” problem-solving 
skills. Traditional mathematics thus contributed to shaping the translation of the 
calculus. The translations for the differential and integral calculus also reflected 
Li Shanlan’s and Hua Hengfang’s training in traditional mathematics. Li Shanlan 
invented the Chinese notations that would become standard for these terms. The-
se traditional forms were replaced, however, by Japanese expressions in the early 
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twentieth century, ironically after Li Shanlan’s and Hua Hengfang’s notations had 
first been introduced in Japan. 
Georges Métailié concludes this section by addressing the formation of mod-
ern botanical terminology in the late nineteenth century. He demonstrates how 
between 1858 and 1898 new botanical terms emerged, many of them from pre-
modern Chinese materia medica (bencao 本 草) traditions. Despite these efforts 
to link “new terms” with “old concepts,” Métailié adds that the modern botanical 
terms later developed in the 1920s had nothing in common with this earlier ter-
minology. As in many other fields of learning after the Sino-Japanese War, new 
terminology from Japan trumped the earlier botanical terms because of Japan’s 
place of eminence as a superior window on the West after 1895. 
The sixth and final set of articles focuses on “grammars of alterity.” Alain 
Peyraube’s contribution modifies our usual understanding of the process of lin-
guistic “Orientalism” in China whereby modern linguists usually conceptualized 
the grammatical structures of the Chinese language using the grammatical terms 
used for Western languages. Peyraube’s account of the first grammar of the Chi-
nese language by Ma Jianzhong shows that earlier claims that Ma’s approach was 
based on Western grammars is overstated. According to Peyraube, Ma sought to 
create a universal grammar using the Chinese language. Nevertheless, Peyraube, 
like Haun Saussy, shows how the Chinese language was deprived of its own 
grammar by a Chinese linguist such as Ma Jianzhong, just as it had been so de-
prived by Western linguists. 
Michael Lackner looks at two Chinese translators long separated in time, the 
medievalist Dao’an faced with translating Buddhist texts and the modernist Yan 
Fu faced with Western texts. Despite their separation in time, Lackner shows that 
they had similar difficulties in conceptualizing the syntactical differences be-
tween the Indo-European source-texts they were translating and the native Chi-
nese they were using to invent the “new terms” of correspondence. Although 
neither Dao’an nor Yan Fu was able to define these linguistic differences be-
tween the source and target texts clearly, their pragmatic use of lexical analogies 
allowed both of them to complete relatively successful translations. We see in 
Lackner’s account of the cognitive process informing translation that linguistic 
commensurability was often a hybrid that assumed each side had the same prag-
matic agendas. But Dao’an and Yan Fu each realized, however, that the Buddhist 
and Western learning they were translating into the target language was unique 
and not easily assimilated by the host culture. 
We should add mention here of Christoph Harbsmeier’s efforts to conclude 
the volume by seeing that linguistic developments in China were comparable to 
those in other places when natives were faced with a radical change in “rhetorical 
preferences.” Harbsmeier considers the Westernization of Chinese discourses in 
the late nineteenth century as a Hellenization of Chinese forms of argument and 
problem solving, although he makes no effort to show how his account matches 
up with Kurtz’s more cautionary tale about the adventures of logic in China. 
Harbsmeier goes on to describe the role of the May Fourth Movement in the 
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formation of a modern Chinese lexicon after 1919, which Harbsmeier sees as a 
culmination of the earlier discoveries and tendencies described in this volume. As 
in other countries this patriotic agenda involved the creation of a national lan-
guage to act as a standardized linguistic medium for nation-building. Thus, for 
Harbsmeier the modern Chinese resemble earlier European and Japanese who 
devised efforts to utilize their language more effectively for national solidarity 
and shared socio-political rhetoric. 
 
Such a rich volume by a group of outstanding editors and contributors will be-
cause of its price not fall into the private hands of many owners. Nevertheless, it 
should be read widely because of its close interrogation of the intersections be-
tween language and history and because of its problematization of the role of 
translation in inventing linguistic commensurabilities between peoples and cul-
tures. Borrow it from the library and read each of the articles carefully. They are 
filled with information and new points of view. But perhaps the agenda of trans-
lation should be problematized a bit further. 
What united the Jesuit and Protestant eras in late imperial Chinese history was 
the religious program they brought as foreigners to China. Their primary project 
of religious conversion required that they translate Christianity into Chinese, 
orally and textually, as well as in ritual practice. Hence, Christians worked with 
Chinese literati converts to present Catholic and Protestant beliefs orally and in 
readable classical Chinese, the lingua franca of educated Chinese until the twen-
tieth century. The majority of works produced by this workmanlike partnership 
were religious works. A significant minority dealt with the emerging social and 
natural sciences, early modern for the Jesuits, and modern for the Protestants. 
How the Jesuits and Protestants worked with their native Chinese informants 
to legitimate the West from 1600 to 1750 and after 1850 is one of the keys to 
understanding the translation enterprise, which packaged Christianity and Euro-
pean science together. Jesuits and Protestants tainted their translation project with 
their own conscious and unconscious predispositions by massaging the literal 
meaning of original European texts. Often they chose simply to capture the spirit 
of the original through a wide-ranging engagement with the classical resources of 
the target language and audience. At other times the missionaries and their Chi-
nese partners created new terminology to present Christian religious and scien-
tific views. Usually however, both sides could find acceptable terms in the ver-
nacular and classical lexicon of Chinese to accommodate the meaning of the 
Western source. Between 1850 and 1900, the new disciplines of chemistry and 
the calculus, for example, increasingly required new concepts—not only new 
words. Such concepts shaped new realities, which empowered many Chinese to 
grasp new scientific discourses. 
In this volume, the authors have bracketed the religious texts that the Catho-
lics and Protestants spent most of their time translating into Chinese. Instead, 
they spotlight the early modern and modern political, linguistic, and scientific 
texts often translated jointly by Christian missionaries and Chinese literati. These 
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science translations were not simply innocent, secular byproducts of the mission-
ary enterprise, however. The science texts the missionaries successfully translated 
into classical Chinese were encoded with Christian messages and religiously-
induced silences. Hence, we should not overlook the willful infiltration of Chris-
tian beliefs in many of the scientific and political textbooks translated into Chi-
nese that influenced men like Yan Fu and Lu Xun, who trained at the Fuzhou 
Shipyard and Jiangnan Arsenal, as well as reformers such as Kang Youwei, Tan 
Sitong, and Liang Qichao. 
The scientific translations by the missionaries and their converts encoded 
their unspoken ideological predispositions. This lack of transparency has been 
underestimated in previous accounts of translation in China and Japan as high-
minded efforts at achieving verisimilitude. Jesuit and Protestant translators did 
not just fail to achieve a seamless word-by-word correspondence from the Latin, 
French, German, or English to the Chinese. Nor were they simply idealistic fail-
ures because they unsuccessfully sought to transmit the spirit of the source 
through more adventuresome literary tactics. The translation enterprise in Japan, 
for example, followed a different cultural trajectory altogether because the Japa-
nese barred the Jesuits early on and stressed their own translations of science in 
the nineteenth century, rather than relying on Protestant middle men. 
To be sure, the Jesuits should not be “black-boxed,” as a religious enemy of 
science. Many were “closet” Copernicans or Newtonians at a time when they 
could not publicly disown the ecclesiastical positions the Pope and the Jesuit 
order took against Copernicus and Galileo. In the end, as Nathan Sivin has ex-
plained, European cosmology was discredited by its own internal incoherence. In 
the seventeenth century, Jesuits in China first presented Copernicus as a follower 
of Ptolemy (and geocentrism) and then of Tycho Brahe (and geoheliocentrism). 
When Michel Benoist finally presented Copernican heliocentrism in the mid-
eighteenth century, Chinese literati thought the presentations too confused to take 
seriously. 
Similarly, the Protestants opposed Darwin’s theory of evolution, particularly 
the survival of the fittest through natural selection. Lacking a unified church such 
as Catholicism under the Pope, the Methodists, Presbyterians, and other 
Protestants who came to China after the Opium War nevertheless were surpris-
ingly even more unanimous in opposing Darwin than the Jesuits had been contra 
Copernicus. Few Protestants in China were “closet” Darwinians; almost all fa-
vored Christianized versions of evolution. Still, the Protestants were not unrelent-
ing enemies of science either, even though they delayed the translation of modern 
biology in China by three decades. 
As translators, the Jesuits and Protestants in China rejected the European 
original when the native source betrayed their religious sensibilities. The result 
was not a failure to communicate. Competent in vernacular Chinese, the Jesuits 
and Protestants communicated well enough to their Chinese partners who pro-
duced the classical translations. Rather, the enterprise of translation became a 
mindful, Christian effort not to translate Copernican heliocentricity or Darwinian 
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evolution in the original to the target audience. We see in this act of dissembling 
about the social and natural sciences a sense of religious commitment that we 
should not underestimate. Jesuit and Protestant dissembling tells us that we must 
further problematize the act of translation ideologically and recognize that the 
Chinese were not privy to the untranslated passages that we are today. What they 
were not told about Copernicus and Darwin before 1900 mattered. 
